Subsea cables that connect Australia, and what happens when one breaks

Photo: Wyncliffe via stocksnap (CC0 1.0)
Almost none of it goes by satellite. That’s the first thing people get wrong. The overwhelming majority of the data that leaves Australia, the video calls, the cloud backups, the bank transfers and the streaming, travels through fibre optic cables lying on the seabed, landing at a small number of beaches on the east and west coasts. There are fewer of them than you’d expect, they break more often than the industry likes to say, and the ships that fix them are scarce. I’ve spent a fair bit of the last two years reading cable-landing planning documents and talking to the people who splice these things, and this is the map as it stands.
The east coast: Sydney’s northern beaches #
Most of Australia’s international capacity to the United States and Asia lands within a few kilometres of each other on Sydney’s northern beaches, around Narrabeen, Collaroy and Dee Why, with landing stations tucked into suburban streets that give no hint of what runs under them. From there the cables reach the big carrier hotels and data centres in the city and out along the corridor to the west.
The workhorses are Southern Cross NEXT, which opened in 2022 and runs from Sydney to Los Angeles via New Zealand and a string of Pacific islands, and its older sibling the original Southern Cross system, still running after more than two decades. Hawaiki, live since 2018, takes a similar path to the US via Auckland and Hawaii. The Japan-Guam-Australia South cable, JGA-S, goes north to Guam and connects onward to Japan and the rest of Asia, and PPC-1, the oldest of the group still in service, runs Sydney to Guam as well. The Coral Sea Cable System, funded largely by the Australian government and switched on in 2019, runs from Sydney to Port Moresby and Honiara and was built for reasons that had as much to do with regional strategy as with bandwidth.

The west coast: Perth’s role #
Perth is Australia’s front door to Singapore and, through it, to the whole of Asia and onward to Europe. The Australia-Singapore Cable, ASC, opened in 2018. INDIGO West, a consortium build involving Telstra, Singtel and Google among others, followed a year later, paired with INDIGO Central, which runs across the Bight to connect Perth to Sydney by sea rather than relying only on the terrestrial routes. The Oman Australia Cable, completed in 2022, gives Perth a direct path to the Middle East and, through Oman, a shorter route to Europe that doesn’t pass through the congested Singapore-Malacca corridor.
That last point matters more than it sounds. For years the Australia-to-Europe path ran through Singapore and then up through the Red Sea or across to the Indian Ocean systems, and a fault in the Strait of Malacca or off Egypt could add tens of milliseconds to a Perth-London connection. Route diversity is the whole game in this business. A country with two paths to the world is one cut away from having one.
How they break #
Ships, mostly. Anchors dragged in bad weather, and trawl gear on the continental shelf, account for the large majority of cable faults worldwide, and the International Cable Protection Committee, the industry body that tracks these things, has been saying so for decades. In shallow water near the landing the cable is armoured with steel wire and usually buried a metre or so under the seabed by a plough. Out in the deep it’s an unarmoured tube about the width of a garden hose, lying on the bottom, protected by nothing but the fact that few things happen at four thousand metres.
The other cause is the seabed itself. When the Hunga Tonga volcano erupted in January 2022 the resulting flows severed Tonga’s only international cable and left the country effectively offline for weeks while a repair ship made its way from Port Moresby and worked the fault. Underwater landslides, triggered by earthquakes, have cut multiple cables at once off Taiwan and off Algeria in the past. Australia’s continental shelf is quieter than most, geologically, which is a genuine advantage nobody planned.
What a repair involves #
A fault is located first by electrical and optical measurements from the landing station, which can place it to within a few hundred metres over thousands of kilometres of cable. Then a repair ship has to get there, and this is the constraint the industry doesn’t advertise. There are only a few dozen cable ships in the world equipped to do repair work, and the ones covering the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions are typically on standing maintenance agreements with consortia of cable owners, which means the ship that services Australia’s east coast is also the ship that services a great many other cables. If two systems fail in the same fortnight, one of them waits.
At the site the ship grapples for the cable, hauls one end aboard, tests it, buoys it off, finds and hauls the other end, and splices in a new length. The splice itself is done by hand, fibre by fibre, in a clean room on the ship, and the joint is then re-armoured, tested and laid back down. In good weather off Sydney a shallow-water repair might take a week from arrival. In deep water, or in a Southern Ocean swell, it takes what it takes. I spoke to a splicer who described a job off the West Australian coast where the ship spent four days doing nothing at all because the sea state wouldn’t allow the crew on deck.
The domestic cables people forget #
Australia also relies on subsea cable for domestic traffic in ways that don’t show up on the international maps. Tasmania is connected to the mainland by the Basslink fibre, which runs alongside the power interconnector across Bass Strait, and by Telstra’s own systems; when one has had trouble the state has felt it. INDIGO Central carries Perth-to-Sydney traffic across the Bight as an alternative to the terrestrial fibre along the Nullarbor, which has been cut by bushfire, flood and, memorably, by a contractor with an excavator more than once. The north is served by cables into Darwin, including a link to Indonesia and the Vocus system that connects Port Hedland and Darwin to Singapore through Christmas Island. And a growing number of offshore energy projects, from Bass Strait gas to the proposed wind zones off Gippsland and the Hunter, will add their own cables to a seabed that is getting busier every year.
I mention the domestic systems because the resilience conversation tends to stop at the international landings, and the terrestrial backhaul from those landings inland is, if anything, more exposed. A cable that survives four thousand kilometres of Pacific can be taken out by roadworks in Brookvale. Ask the carriers about their diverse paths from the landing station to the city, and watch how quickly the conversation becomes specific.
Why it usually doesn’t matter, and when it will #
Most of the time a cable fault in Australia is invisible to the public, because traffic re-routes across the other systems within seconds and the capacity headroom absorbs it. That’s the point of having several. The system works because the cable owners, who are competitors, share maintenance ships and standby capacity in a way that’s a quiet model of cooperation, and because the Australian Communications and Media Authority protects the landing zones off Sydney and Perth as declared areas where anchoring and trawling are restricted, with real penalties. The ACMA’s submarine cable protection regime is one of the more sensible pieces of telecommunications law on the books and almost nobody has heard of it.
The scenario that worries the engineers I talk to is not one fault but several, close together, at a time when the repair ship is elsewhere. Sydney’s landings are geographically clustered. A single event on the northern beaches, whether a storm, a shipping incident or something deliberate, that damaged multiple systems would test the headroom in a way no ordinary fault does. The obvious answer is more landing diversity, more cables into Melbourne, Brisbane and the north, and the federal infrastructure department has been saying as much in its policy work for some years. The less obvious answer is that the new capacity being built by the hyperscalers, who now own or part-own a growing share of the cables landing here, is making the country more connected and more dependent on a small number of companies at the same time.
In my view that second trend deserves more attention than it gets. When the cables were owned by telcos the government had a lever it understood. When they’re owned by cloud providers, the lever is less clear, and the day a cable is cut is not the day to work out who to ring.
I keep a map of the landings pinned above my desk, next to the ride routes. Both are lines on a coast that most people never think about until something goes wrong.
— Declan Ferris, Infrastructure Correspondent, Technology Spectator