The term sheet clauses founders tell me they regret

Photo: Lauren Mancke via stocksnap (CC0 1.0)
“I didn’t read it. I read the valuation.” A founder said that to me across a table in Surry Hills last year, about a Series A she’d signed in 2021, and she said it without embarrassment because she knows, now, that almost everyone does the same. I did the same, in 2018, as the third employee of a company whose term sheet I was handed to “have a look at” and looked at for about four minutes. The valuation is one number. The term sheet is a dozen mechanisms that decide what that number means when the company is sold, when it raises again, or when it doesn’t. Having lived through two of these from the inside, one that ended well and one that didn’t, and having since read a dozen more for friends, here are the clauses founders consistently tell me they regret, and what the standard Australian documents do with them.
The liquidation preference #
This is the clause that decides who gets paid first when the company is sold, and for how much. A “1x non-participating” preference, which is the standard in the open-source seed and Series A documents published by the Australian Investment Council, means the investor gets back what they put in, or their share of the proceeds as an ordinary shareholder, whichever is higher. That’s fair and it’s what you should expect.
The regrets come from two variations. A multiple above 1x, where the investor gets two or three times their money before anyone else sees a dollar, which was rare in Australia until the 2022 downturn made investors cautious and is now something you’ll see proposed. And “participating” preferred, where the investor gets their money back and then also shares in what’s left as if they were an ordinary shareholder. On a modest exit, participation can mean the founders who built the company receive a fraction of what the valuation implied. Ask, every time, “is this non-participating, and is it 1x”. If the answer to either is no, you’re being asked to pay for the round in a currency that only becomes visible at the exit.

Anti-dilution #
If the next round is priced lower than this one, a down round, anti-dilution protection adjusts the earlier investor’s price so they’re issued more shares to compensate. The standard and fair version is “broad-based weighted average”, which softens the adjustment by accounting for the size of the down round relative to the whole company. The version to avoid is “full ratchet”, which reprices the entire earlier investment to the new lower price regardless of how small the down round was. A full ratchet on a small bridge round in 2023 is the story behind more than one of the cap tables I’ve been shown that no longer make sense to the people on them.
The option pool shuffle #
Investors will usually require an employee share option pool of ten to fifteen per cent, which is reasonable; you need it to hire. The trick is when the pool is created. If it’s created before the round, on the “pre-money” side, the dilution from the pool falls entirely on the existing shareholders, the founders, and the investor’s percentage is calculated after it. If it’s created after, everyone shares the dilution. The difference on a $5 million raise at a $20 million valuation is a couple of percentage points of the company, and a couple of percentage points of the company is, at a good exit, a house.
The negotiation is to size the pool to the actual hiring plan for the next eighteen months, not to a round number the investor’s template prefers, and to have the plan in writing so the number is defensible. Founders tell me this is the clause they most wish they’d pushed on, because it’s the one where pushing almost always works.
Board composition and the protective provisions #
A seat on the board is normal for a lead investor. Control of the board is not, at seed or Series A, and a structure that gives investors a majority, or an “independent” director the investors effectively choose, is a control transfer dressed as governance. Separately, the protective provisions, the list of things the company can’t do without investor consent, need reading line by line. Approving the budget, issuing new shares and selling the company belong on the list. Hiring above a salary threshold, signing a customer contract above a value, and changing the product roadmap don’t, and I’ve seen all three in term sheets presented as “standard”.
The founder who told me she read the valuation and not the terms discovered, eighteen months later, that she needed investor consent to open an office in Brisbane. It was granted. It took six weeks.
A related trap is the “drag-along”, which lets a majority of shareholders force everyone to sell if a buyer wants the whole company. It’s standard and it’s necessary; a single holdout shouldn’t be able to block an exit. The version to read carefully sets the threshold. A drag that can be triggered by the investors alone, without founder consent, means the company can be sold out from under the people running it at a price the preference stack makes attractive to the investors and unattractive to everyone else. Ask for a threshold that requires a founder majority as well, at least while the founders are still running the business.
Founder vesting and the leaver clauses #
Investors will ask founders to re-vest a portion of their shares over three or four years, so a founder who leaves early doesn’t walk away with a third of the company. Founders resent this and it’s usually right; the co-founder who leaves in month nine is a more common story than anyone likes to admit, and the ones who stay are grateful for the clause. What needs attention is the distinction between a “good leaver” and a “bad leaver”, who gets to decide which you are, and what happens to unvested shares in each case. A definition of bad leaver that includes “resignation for any reason” turns the vesting schedule into a lock, and a founder who wants to leave for a genuine reason after two years finds their equity forfeited at nominal value. The standard documents draw this line reasonably. Bespoke ones drawn by the investor’s lawyers sometimes don’t.
Information rights and the pro rata #
Two smaller clauses that generate outsized grief. Information rights give an investor access to the company’s financials and board materials, which is reasonable for a lead and less so for every small cheque in the round; a cap table with fifteen investors each entitled to monthly management accounts is a reporting job for the founder every month for the life of the company. Limit the full package to the major investors, with a threshold, and give everyone else the quarterly update.
The pro rata right lets an investor maintain their percentage by participating in future rounds. It’s standard and fair for the lead. Where founders come unstuck is a “super pro rata”, which lets an investor take more than their share of the next round, effectively reserving a slice of your Series B for them before the Series B lead has been found. Series B leads dislike arriving to find their allocation pre-sold. It complicates the round you most need to go smoothly, and it’s rarely worth whatever was traded for it.
What the standard documents do about all this #
Australia is lucky here. The Australian Investment Council publishes open-source seed and Series A term sheets and subscription agreements that most reputable funds start from, and they take fair positions on every clause above. If a term sheet you’re offered departs from them, ask why, and expect a reason that’s specific to your company rather than “our template”. The SAFE-style instruments that many pre-seed rounds now use defer most of these questions to the priced round, which is convenient and also means a founder can arrive at their Series A with several years of terms they’ve never negotiated. Read the conversion mechanics.
And spend the money on a lawyer who does this weekly. Not your family solicitor, not the friend who did your lease. The fees on a Series A, in my experience, are a fraction of a per cent of the round and pay for themselves on the option pool clause alone. The federal business portal has plain-language material on raising capital and on the R&D Tax Incentive, which interacts with your share structure in ways worth understanding before, not after.
Finally, the exclusivity period. A term sheet usually asks the founder not to talk to other investors for a period while the lead does its due diligence, and thirty days is normal. Sixty is long. Ninety, with an option to extend, is a fund taking your round off the market while it makes up its mind, and if it walks at day 85 you’ve lost a quarter. Keep it short, and make it end automatically if the investor hasn’t delivered a subscription agreement by a fixed date.
The one I’d push back on hardest #
The clause I’d tell any founder to refuse outright, and I’ll be direct because I watched it play out on my own options, is the participating preference with a multiple. It’s not a term. It’s a different deal wearing the same valuation, and a fund that proposes it either doesn’t expect a good exit or expects you not to notice. Either way, that’s information about the fund.
The founder from the first paragraph raised again this year. She sent me the term sheet before she signed it, with notes. The notes were better than mine, which I’ll take as a sign that the four minutes I spent in 2018 have been adequately atoned for.
— Sophie Lindqvist, AI, Start-ups & Fintech Editor, Technology Spectator